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Abstract 
NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) and 
The MITRE Corporation (MITRE) have developed—
and successfully demonstrated—an integrated 
simulation-to-flight capability for evaluating sense 
and avoid (SAA) system elements. This integrated 
capability consists of a MITRE developed fast-time 
computer simulation for evaluating SAA algorithms, 
and a NASA LaRC surrogate unmanned aircraft 
system (UAS) equipped to support hardware and 
software in-the-loop evaluation of SAA system 
elements (e.g., algorithms, sensors, architecture, 
communications, autonomous systems), concepts, 
and procedures. The fast-time computer simulation 
subjects algorithms to simulated flight encounters/ 
conditions and generates a fitness report that records 
strengths, weaknesses, and overall performance. 
Reviewed algorithms (and their fitness report) are 
then transferred to NASA LaRC where additional 
(joint) airworthiness evaluations are performed on the 
candidate SAA system-element configurations, 
concepts, and/or procedures of interest; software and 
hardware components are integrated into the 
Surrogate UAS’ research systems; and flight safety 
and mission planning activities are completed. 
Onboard the Surrogate UAS, candidate SAA system 
element configurations, concepts, and/or procedures 
are subjected to flight evaluations and in-flight 
performance is monitored. The Surrogate UAS, 
which can be controlled remotely via generic Ground 
Station uplink or automatically via onboard systems, 
operates with a NASA Safety Pilot/Pilot in Command 
onboard to permit safe operations in mixed airspace 
with manned aircraft. An end-to-end demonstration 
of a typical application of the capability was 
performed in non-exclusionary airspace in October 
2011; additional research, development, flight 
testing, and evaluation efforts using this integrated 
capability are planned throughout fiscal year 2012 
and 2013 
Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to document the 
development of simulation and flight-test 
capabilities, and describe initial testing of prototype 
sense and avoid (SAA) algorithms for unmanned 
aircraft systems (UAS). The routine operation of 
UAS in non-segregated civil airspace presents many 
technical, operational, and policy challenges. One of 
the greatest challenges is the development of a 
capability for unmanned aircraft to ‘sense and avoid’ 
other aircraft, which is required as mitigation for the 
lack of an on-board pilot. SAA includes the ability to 
both assure safe separation (i.e., remain well-clear) 
from other aircraft and to take immediate, evasive 
action to avoid an imminent collision. This ensures 
compliance with existing rules governing both 
operations near other aircraft and right-of-way (i.e., 
U.S. Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Title 14, 
Part 91, Paragraphs 91.111 and 91.113). 
Cooperative, automatic sense-and-avoid is one 
potential form of such a capability. “Cooperative” 
refers to the source of the “sense” information 
identifying the locations of other aircraft, and 
specifically refers to transmissions (e.g., Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast [ADS-B] 
messages) from the other aircraft. “Automatic” refers 
to the “Avoid” capability of detecting potential 
conflicts or collision hazards, and executing the 
appropriate avoidance maneuver. Specifically it 
refers to on-board automation that does not require 
action from the remote pilot, although the pilot may 
be informed and could override a maneuver if 
necessary. An automatic capability is important 
because it is not susceptible to vulnerabilities and 
latencies in the UAS command and control link (i.e., 
it continues to be effective even if the remote pilot 
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loses direct control over the unmanned aircraft due to 
a lost command and control link). 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has 
mandated the use of ADS-B transmitters (i.e., ADS-B 
OUT) by 2020 on aircraft that operate in airspace that 
today requires operation of Mode C or Mode S 
transponders [1]. This will include most, but by no 
means all, aircraft operating in the National Airspace 
System (NAS). For the sense-and-avoid functionality, 
there are many advantages to using cooperative 
sensors (i.e., ADS-B IN) instead of non-cooperative 
sensors (e.g., radar, electro-optic), including better 
accuracy and integrity of aircraft position data. This 
improvement in accuracy and integrity leads to 
simpler conflict detection and collision avoidance 
algorithms, which in turn reduces the complexity and 
cost for development and certification. Cooperative 
sensors also offer significant advantages in reduced 
size, weight, and power requirements for the 
unmanned aircraft. 
Significant research is needed to determine if a 
cooperative, automatic SAA capability is viable. 
Such research includes the ability to evaluate 
prospective algorithms. The MITRE Corporation and 
NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) collaborated 
to develop an integrated simulation and flight test 
capability for testing prototype SAA system elements 
with an initial emphasis on ADS-B based algorithmic 
alternatives for self separation. 
The research team’s near-term goals for this 
integrated simulation-to-flight capability were to: 
• Establish an effective tool for exploring 
the technical and operational issues 
associated with ABS-B based SAA 
algorithms; 
• Support the transition between simulation 
and flight testing by providing information 
relevant to the safety-focused flight release 
process; and 
• Promote interoperability within both 
testbeds (i.e., simulation and flight test) via 
the use of well-defined standards and 
interface requirements. 
The remainder of the paper describes: SAA 
system elements; the simulation testbed developed by 
MITRE; the flight-test platform and testbed 
developed by NASA LaRC; the integrated test 
concept used to bring the two capabilities together; 
and the capability demonstration conducted 
collaboratively by MITRE and NASA LaRC in 
October 2011. It concludes with a description of 
future studies and a summary. 
Sense and Avoid System Elements 
To support the development of this integrated 
simulation-to-flight capability, the research team 
needed at least one candidate SAA system. Key 
aspects of the candidate ADS-B based SAA system 
used are described below. 
Hardware & Software 
The SAA system design included the following 
elements of aircraft hardware and software: 
• A real or simulated ADS-B transceiver 
with integrated Wide Area Augmentation 
System (WAAS) GPS to provide position, 
velocity, and identification information for 
own-ship and proximate traffic; 
• Research computers that execute one or 
more SAA algorithms and provide 
formatted instructions to the aircraft 
autopilot/flight director function; 
• A real or simulated research autopilot 
control system that accepts and executes 
flight path commands generated by the 
SAA system; 
• A data-recording system that captures 
flight data and SAA system inputs and 
outputs; 
• A notification function that alerts the 
NASA Safety Pilot/Pilot in Command of 
the SAA system's status (flight test 
platform only); and 
• SAA system software (e.g., SAA 
algorithm) that receives traffic 
information, identifies potential conflicts, 
and issues flight path commands. 
Data 
The SAA algorithm uses both ADS-B traffic 
data and own-ship data to assess whether a conflict 
exists with proximate traffic. The SAA system may 
also use own-ship flight plan and other data (e.g., 
table-based or rule-based inputs) to determine the 
optimum avoidance maneuver and/or post conflict 
maneuver. Whether in simulation or in actual flight 
test, data collection includes the track data on other 
simulated or actual traffic, own-ship track and state 
vector data, algorithm state and results, and computed 
values for a range of metrics discussed later in this 
paper. 
Personnel 
The SAA system is designed for automatic 
operation, and when fully enabled, will provide flight 
path commands to the flight test aircraft without 
further input from the Ground Station operator. With 
algorithms that enable automated return to flight 
path, the SAA system may identify conflicts, 
maneuver to resolve one or more of those conflicts, 
and return to flight path without pilot intervention, 
thus, modeling the behavior of an actual UAS 
equipped with the capability. 
Communications 
The SAA system as modeled for this project is 
designed to operate automatically, which is to say 
without required intervention or command cueing 
from the Ground Station operator controlling the 
UAS. A fully developed SAA capability for UAS 
would further ensure that the Ground Station operator 
could intervene in conflict situations as desired where 
command data link is available. 
Simulation Testbed 
It is neither feasible nor practical to exhaustively 
test SAA algorithms in flight. To evaluate the 
performance of SAA algorithms across a wide array 
of flight encounters and conditions, MITRE 
developed a simulation testbed (see Figure 1). The 
simulated encounters will augment flight-test 
evaluations and efficiently expose algorithm 
sensitivities via computer simulation. As algorithms 
are subjected to recorded and simulated flight 
encounters/conditions within the simulation testbed, 
individual responses are documented. Then, using 
predefined rating criteria as a guide, the testbed 
generates a fitness report that describes the strengths, 
weaknesses, and overall performance of the reviewed 
algorithms. Subsequent flight tests help validate the 
computer simulation outcomes.  
 
Figure 1. Simulation Testbed 
System Overview 
Key elements of the simulation testbed are 
described below. 
MITRE algorithmEvaluator. At the core of the 
simulation testbed is a utility called the MITRE 
algorithmEvaluator. The MITRE algorithmEvaluator 
is a fast-time computer simulation that integrates new 
capabilities with legacy models, databases, and 
resources to perform five primary functions: load 
SAA algorithms; check interface compliance; 
introduce conflicts; interrogate proposed resolutions; 
and assess overall performance. 
Algorithms. Sense-and-avoid logic often 
combines an understanding of aircraft kinematics, 
aircraft dynamics, aviation operations, and 
mathematics to monitor proximate traffic, identify 
potential conflicts, assess possible resolutions, and 
issue maneuver commands. While multiple 
surveillance sources exist from which an algorithm 
can formulate a view of proximate traffic, the MITRE 
algorithmEvaluator was designed to review 
algorithms that rely principally on cooperative 
surveillance sources (e.g., ADS-B services) for such 
information. 
Ratings Criteria. Multiple measurements are 
logged each time an algorithm is subjected to 
recorded and/or simulated flight encounters and 
conditions. Ratings criteria provide the analyst with a 
mechanism for weighting the relative importance of 
one measurement over another when the simulation 
testbed generates its overall Fitness Report. 
Interface Control Documents. To enable 
concurrent, independent development of SAA 
algorithms and the seamless integration of new 
capabilities with legacy models, databases, and 
resources, interface requirements are defined and 
captured via interface control documents (ICDs). For 
example, during algorithm evaluation, compliance 
with the ICD governing the Surrogate UAS’ interface 
[2] is actively verified via the MITRE 
algorithmEvaluator to ensure seamless transition 
from simulation testbed to flight-test platform. 
Performance Envelope. The MITRE 
algorithmEvaluator provides a definable 
‘performance envelope’ to narrow the available 
solution space (i.e., constrain the set of acceptable 
resolutions). Using this mechanism, analysts can 
introduce limiting conditions (e.g., separation 
thresholds, ceilings, floors, turn rates, turn angle) into 
the evaluation schema. 
Aircraft Parameters. Aircraft performance 
characteristics are platform dependent. To faithfully 
represent flight dynamics across various platforms of 
interest, the MITRE algorithmEvaluator interfaces 
with commercially available datasets (e.g., 
EUROCONTROL’s Base of Aircraft Data [BADA]). 
In addition, analysts can introduce custom aircraft by 
supplying relevant performance parameters. 
Encounter Modeling. To explore algorithm 
performance across a multitude of challenge 
geometries, the MITRE algorithmEvaluator 
interfaces with existing encounter models (e.g., MIT 
Lincoln Laboratory’s uncorrelated encounter model 
of the NAS [3]), recorded flight data, and trajectory- 
generation tools. As such, analysts can obtain an 
understanding of how a given algorithm responds to a 
wide variety of encounter geometries, previously 
flown geometries, and/or a specific geometry of 
interest. 
Environmental Effects. Viable resolutions must 
take the operational environment into account. To 
introduce operational artifacts (e.g., airspace 
designations), restrictions (e.g., temporary flight 
restrictions), hazards (e.g., terrain), and weather 
effects (e.g., wind), the MITRE algorithmEvaluator 
provides a definable ‘environmental effects’ module. 
Using this mechanism, analysts can introduce 
environmental factors of interest into the evaluation 
schema. 
MITRE Computing Resources. To tap into the 
execution benefits of grid and cloud computing, 
efficiently explore the simulation testbed’s response 
surface using Design of Experiments techniques, and 
access a wide array of commercially available data 
processing and visualization tools, the MITRE 
algorithmEvaluator interfaces with MITRE’s goal-
directed grid enabled computing framework. In 
addition, the MITRE algorithmEvaluator interfaces 
with MITRE’s legacy airspace modeling tools (e.g., 
Air Traffic Surveillance Simulation [ATSSim]) to 
introduce pilotage factors (e.g., flight technical error) 
and navigational errors, model Radar surveillance 
and ADS-B performance factors, and interface with 
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System 
(TCAS) II Version 7 logic [4]. 
Fitness Report and Reviewed Algorithms. 
Evaluation results for reviewed algorithms are 
presented in both summary and detailed form within 
the Fitness Report. See the ‘Evaluation Methods’ and 
‘Fitness Metrics’ sections below for details. 
Intended Use 
The simulation testbed was designed to evaluate 
the performance of SAA algorithms across a wide 
array of flight encounters and conditions. Its initial 
operating capability focuses on the review of sense-
and-avoid logic that utilizes cooperative surveillance 
sources to maintain a user defined separation 
threshold for operations in Class E airspace that will 
include potential intruders operating under visual 
flight rules (VFR). To that end, effort was taken to 
ensure that the simulation testbed could isolate and 
explore SAA algorithm sensitivities to the following 
variables of interest: 
• Sources of cooperative-surveillance 
information (e.g., ADS-B, Traffic 
Information Service Broadcast [TIS-B]); 
• Quality of cooperative-surveillance 
information (e.g., availability, integrity, 
and accuracy); 
• Density and composition of proximate 
traffic; 
• Performance envelope selections (e.g., 
separation-threshold setting); 
• Environmental effects; and 
• Own-ship selection. 
Capability Description 
The simulation testbed can be operated in either 
a portable or a network-enabled mode. In the portable 
mode, the MITRE algorithmEvaluator operates in a 
standalone configuration; using only the computing 
power of the computing device (e.g., laptop) on 
which it is resident. In this mode, an analyst can 
evaluate algorithms using both Monte Carlo and 
discrete event simulation techniques supported 
locally by the MITRE algorithmEvaluator. This 
particular mode is well suited to performing field 
examinations of minor-algorithm modifications when 
deployed to remote test locations. 
In the network-enabled mode the simulation 
testbed leverages a middleware framework called the 
MITRE Elastic Goal-Directed Simulation Framework 
(i.e., MEG) to perform goal-directed, grid-based 
replication management across MITRE’s large 
computing clusters [5]. In this mode, the analyst 
defines variables of interests and uses MEG’s Design 
of Experiments services to efficiently explore the 
model’s response frontier. This particular mode is 
well suited for performing detailed sensitivity 
analyses quickly. 
Evaluation Methods 
SAA algorithm performance is evaluated 
relative to three levels of appropriateness: encounter, 
environment, and task. As illustrated in Figure 2, 
each level of consideration builds upon the prior; 
effectively narrowing the viable solution space in the 
process. The initial operating capability of the 
simulation testbed is focused primarily on the 
encounter and environment levels; relative 
weightings (contained within the rating criteria) 
convey suitability/appropriateness conventions and 
can be used to explore tradeoffs both within and 
among the individual levels. 
 Figure 2. Evaluation Schema 
Encounter-level determinations examine an 
algorithm’s proposed resolutions relative to 
proximate traffic and aircraft capabilities. At this 
level of examination, the set of viable solutions is 
constrained largely by traffic density, relative motion 
(i.e., trajectories and geometries), and achievable 
motion (i.e., aircraft performance capabilities). 
Environment-level determinations examine an 
algorithm’s proposed resolutions relative to the 
situational context and the constraints/limitation 
imposed therein. At this level of examination, the set 
of viable solutions is constrained largely by airspace 
restrictions, hazards, guidelines (e.g., right-of-way 
rules), and performance-envelope settings. 
Task-level determinations examine an 
algorithm’s proposed resolutions relative to the 
operational factors that prompted own-ship’s launch. 
At this level of examination, the set of viable 
solutions is constrained largely by factors such as: 
deviation from planned orbit; time-over-target; 
payload orientation relative to target; and fuel 
consumption. 
Fitness Metrics 
In the initial operating capability of the 
simulation testbed, the key metrics described in Table 
1 are captured when triggered by one of four events: 
• Algorithm declares an impending loss of 
the specified separation threshold (i.e., 
predicted loss of separation [PLOS] Alert); 
• Algorithm issues a maneuver command 
(i.e., PLOS Action); 
• Algorithm declares a maneuver finished 
(i.e., PLOS Release); and/or 
• Testbed signals end of the Test (i.e., Test 
End). 
Table 1. Triggers & Metrics –“What is Measured When” 
Trigger(s) Metric Definition 
PLOS Alert; 
PLOS Action Distance to PLOS 
Distance to the point where the specified separation is 
lost 
PLOS Alert; 
PLOS Action Time to PLOS Time to the point where the specified separation is lost 
PLOS Alert; 
PLOS Action 
Predicted Miss 
Distance 
Forecast of the distance between own-ship and the 
intruder aircraft at closest point of approach 
PLOS Alert; 
PLOS Action Alignment 
Relative location to the Intruder Aircraft (e.g., right of, 
left of, head on, overtake) 
PLOS Action Maneuver Type 
Description of the issued maneuver command (i.e., 
Heading Change, Altitude Change, Speed Change, 
ComboH/A, ComboA/S, ComboH/A/S) 
PLOS Release Maneuver Effect Net change in separation distance 
PLOS Release Maneuver Strength 
Description of the maneuver command’s aggressiveness 
in terms of specified and allowable: turn angle, turn rate, 
speed change (acceleration/deceleration), and 
climb/descend rates. 
PLOS Release Maneuver Delay Time between commanded action and executed action 
Test End Resolution Matrix 
Exploration of the encounter space: 
 
Test End Violation Ratio 
Compares Loss of Separation (LOS) occurrences with 
and without the Algorithm engaged: 
(# LOS with Algorithm) / (# LOS without Algorithm) 
Test End Violation Severity Indication of the depth and duration of the violation. 
Test End Induced Violation Number of LOS occurrences instigated by the Algorithm 
Test End Flight Path Deviation Maximum deviation from the nominal flight path. 
Test End Nuisance Alert Errant declaration of an impending loss of the specified 
separation threshold 
Test End Minimum Miss Distance (Intruder) 
Minimum distance between own-ship and the intruder 
aircraft 
Note: Minimum horizontal distance between own-ship and the intruder aircraft 
when not separated vertically.  Minimum difference in altitude between own-
ship and intruder aircraft when not separated horizontally. 
Test End Minimum Miss Distance (Ceiling) 
Minimum vertical distance between own-ship and the 
specified ceiling 
Test End Minimum Miss Distance (Floor) 
Minimum vertical distance between own-ship and the 
specified floor 
Test End Minimum Miss Distance (Hazard) 
Minimum distance between own-ship and other hazards 
(e.g., terrain, TRF, restricted airspace, manmade obstacle) 
 Using the above metrics, the Fitness Report 
summarizes an SAA algorithm’s performance against 
a given test case (i.e., a unique combination of flight 
encounter and conditions) and the set of all test cases 
to which it was subjected. In addition, using the 
before mentioned ratings criteria, the relative 
importance of one measurement over another—as 
conveyed by the analyst’s weighting selections— is 
taken into account to generate a single utility score 
for the algorithm. 
Flight-Test Platform and Testbed 
The basis for the NASA LaRC Surrogate UAS 
flight-test platform is a Cirrus Design SR22 single 
engine, four-place, composite construction, general-
aviation aircraft. The aircraft has been used as a flight 
test research aircraft since 2001. Over the years, 
many modifications were made to transform the 
aircraft into a research platform. These modifications 
include the installation of an independent power 
system, instrumented surfaces and controls, a data 
acquisition system, video cameras and recorders, air 
data and heading reference system (ADAHRS), 
Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) ADS-B 
IN/OUT, and a system of networked research 
computers. Surrogate UAS specific modifications 
include redundant VHF data-link radios, remote 
control via modified two-axis autopilot, an 
autothrottle system, and a Ground Station. 
 
Figure 3. Surrogate UAS System Diagram 
System Overview 
The heart of the Surrogate UAS is the aircraft 
general purpose computer (shown as GPC-3 in the 
figure above). This computer is connected to the 
major aircraft systems and sensors. These include the 
following: the ADAHRS which supplies air data, 
position, attitude, and inertial data; the S-TEC 55X 
(modified), which permits the GPC-3 to control the 
autopilot's modes, vertical speed settings, and provide 
steering inputs; the Avidyne EX5000 Multi-Function 
Display (MFD), which displays research-computer 
generated moving map information; an instrument 
panel switch, which enables the Avidyne MFD to 
display either normal navigation data or research 
video from the GPC-3; two full duplex Teledesign 
TS-4000 VHF radio modems for passing state, status, 
and command data (e.g., altitude, heading, vertical 
speed, airspeed) between the Surrogate UAS and the 
Ground Station; the Garmin GDL-90 UAT, which 
provides ADS-B, TIS-B, and Flight Information 
Service – Broadcast (FIS-B) data; and the human-
machine interface. 
A second general purpose computer, GPC-1, is 
used to host the SAA algorithms and provide separate 
partitioning of the flight software. The main 
computer, GPC-3, has the job of interfacing to the 
aircraft systems and sensors, gathering data, and 
flying the aircraft through the autopilot and 
autothrottle. The second computer is intended only to 
host auxiliary software and does not interface directly 
to any of the aircraft systems other than the 10/100 
Mbs network switch and the Operator Workstation. 
The data processed by GPC-1 is served to it by GPC-
3 over the network. Processed results are passed back 
to GPC-3 over the network. 
Intended Use 
The Surrogate UAS System was created to serve 
as a research platform to aide in the investigation and 
testing of systems, sensors, and procedures that will 
make it possible to safely integrate unmanned aircraft 
into the non-segregated civil airspace. The Surrogate 
UAS System makes use of many research systems 
previously installed onboard the SR22 to enhance its 
role as a research platform. These previously 
installed systems include a separate research power 
system, the ADAHRS, video cameras, video 
recorders, instrumentation, and multiple research 
computers. It is envisioned that researchers from 
NASA, other government agencies, and academic 
institutions would use the Surrogate UAS to research 
and test UAS technology. The basic Surrogate UAS 
concept of operations (CONOPS) requires an 
experienced NASA Safety Pilot/Pilot in Command 
and Systems Operator on board for all research 
flights. This CONOPS makes it possible to “file and 
fly” almost anywhere in the NAS and interoperate 
with other air traffic under existing air traffic control 
(ATC) rules. This makes it possible to perform 
research and test systems in the NAS under real-
world conditions with other traffic subject to normal 
ATC rules. Real UAS can-not be used in this way 
and must be operated in a manner that is either 
segregated from other manned aircraft in restricted 
airspace, or with operational restrictions under a 
Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) or 
Special Airworthiness Certificate-Experimental 
Category (SAC-EC). 
Capability Description 
The Surrogate UAS is capable of remote control 
from the Ground Station, the onboard Systems 
Operator, or automatically via onboard software. In 
all three modes, remote control is accomplished via 
the issuance of four commands: altitude, vertical 
speed, heading, and airspeed. The remote control 
process begins when the aircraft is 500 feet or more 
above ground level (AGL) as specified by safety 
procedures. The aircraft must be above 500 feet 
before the modified autopilot circuit breaker may be 
engaged. When the Ground Station is in control of 
the aircraft, the range of operation can extend from 
35 to 40 nautical miles from the Ground Station. The 
UAS software can command heading changes by 
sending GPS Steering (GPSS) signals to the 
autopilot. This results in bank angle commands of up 
to ±25 degrees. The autopilot may further limit this 
external command according to internal control laws 
based on the aircraft ground speed to maintain turns 
to 90% of standard rate. In most cases, the actual 
bank angle command is 17 to 20 degrees for a 
significant heading change. 
To engage the Surrogate UAS mode and control 
the aircraft, a series of actions are required by both 
the Safety Pilot/Pilot in Command and the Systems 
Operator. The sequence begins with enabling power 
to the modified S-TEC Autopilot at a predetermined 
altitude above 500 feet AGL. When the aircraft is in 
level flight and stable at a pre-briefed altitude and 
speed, the Safety Pilot/Pilot in Command activates a 
switch that switches the autopilot steering signal 
source from the Garmin GNS 430 navigation unit to 
the GPC-3 research computer. A second switch is 
activated to engage the clutch in the autothrottle drive 
servo. At this point, the Systems Operator may set a 
boolean in the software that enables computer control 
of the S-TEC autopilot and the autothrottle. In this 
configuration, the Ground Station is able to send 
commands (i.e., altitude, vertical speed, heading, and 
airspeed) to the aircraft for transfer to the autopilot 
and autothrottle. If the plan is for the Systems 
Operator to control the aircraft, a second boolean 
must be set to disable Ground Station control and 
enable the Systems Operator to send commands. In 
the autonomous mode, software running in a separate 
computer (GPC-1) is enabled and allowed to pass 
UAS Commands over the network to GPC-3 for 
translation into autonomous aircraft maneuvers. For 
the SAA flight tests, the autonomous mode is used. 
Safety Features 
Many safety features are designed into the 
Surrogate UAS System. The main safety feature 
centers on the use of the autopilot to provide 
Surrogate UAS control of the aircraft. The autopilot 
is a limited authority device that can be overridden, 
disengaged or disabled by the Safety Pilot/Pilot in 
Command. The Surrogate UAS System is indirectly 
flying the aircraft by sending commands to the 
limited authority autopilot. The autopilot can be 
disengaged by pressing the autopilot disengage 
button on either the Pilot's or Co-Pilot's side arm 
controller. The autopilot disengage signal is also read 
by the Surrogate UAS software and is programmed to 
terminate any command or control signals to the 
autopilot or autothrottle. The Systems Operator can 
also disable all autopilot and autothrottle command 
and control signals by resetting the Enable Remote 
Control Boolean in the software. By design, the 
Safety Pilot/Pilot in Command can also disable the 
autopilot by pulling the autopilot circuit breaker 
without looking for it (i.e., a collar was placed over 
the autopilot circuit breaker to enable the Safety 
Pilot/Pilot in Command to feel and pull it without 
seeing it). 
The autothrottle can be overridden by applying 
more force than the 11.7 ft-lbs (41.3 in-lbs) set in the 
drive servo clutch. The autothrottle can also be 
disabled by the deactivating the Clutch Enable 
Switch that is conveniently located on the center 
console. An additional safety feature is a quick-
disconnect on each end of the autothrottle drive shaft. 
Cotter pins on each end of the shaft allow for quick 
and easy removal of the throttle drive shaft. This 
action will completely disable the autothrottle and 
return the throttle to its normal unmodified condition. 
The separate and independent research power 
system is an additional safety feature. This allows the 
Safety Pilot/Pilot in Command or the Systems 
Operator to disable all research power with one 
centrally located Research Power Switch on the 
center console. This action will remove power from 
all research systems and stop all inputs to the 
autopilot and autothrottle. The combination of an 
experienced Safety Pilot/Pilot in Command and a 
Systems Operator is also one of the Surrogate UAS 
safety features. The Systems Operator is responsible 
for the operation and control of all the research 
systems hardware and software. This division of 
responsibilities makes it possible for the Safety 
Pilot/Pilot in Command to concentrate solely on 
traditional pilot duties. 
Research Systems 
Several research systems were installed 
specifically for the Surrogate UAS mode of 
operations. These systems include the two Teledesign 
TS-4000 VHF radio modems. These radios operate as 
redundant full duplex message conduits between the 
aircraft and Ground Station, and they operate on two 
authorized frequencies in the 150-174 MHz VHF 
band. Customized half-wave dipole antennas were 
built in-house for the radios. Both antennas are tuned 
to their respective operating frequencies for 
maximum efficiency. 
The autothrottle is also an in-house design and 
customized for the aircraft. The autothrottle drive 
servo is a standard Cobham S-TEC model 108 pitch 
servo. The digital to analog converter is also a 
standard off the shelf component. The autothrottle 
servo amplifier, mounting structure, and drive shaft 
were designed and built in house. The autothrottle 
can be completely removed from the aircraft when it 
is desired to restore the aircraft to the non-research 
mode. The Surrogate UAS autopilot is a modified 
Cobham S-TEC 55X two-axis model that is common 
and found in many general aviation aircraft. 
Modifications were made inside the autopilot and 
wiring was added and brought outside the unit on 
unused rear connector interface pins. The additional 
wiring is connected to GPC-3 to enable mode and 
vertical speed control. Lateral steering is 
accomplished by inputting ARINC 429 steering and 
ground speed signals from GPC-3 in place of the 
Garmin GNS-430 navigation unit. With the ability to 
control the autopilot mode, vertical axis, and the 
lateral axis, 3-D flight is possible from the research 
computer. A Condor CEI-520 PCI card in GPC-3 has 
both ARINC 429 and discrete input/output capability 
to control the autopilot. 
Human Machine Interface 
The Surrogate UAS human machine interface is 
accomplished through the use of switches, knobs, a 
keyboard, a mouse, computer generated video 
screens, and the software graphical user interface 
(GUI). The mouse is a custom designed three button 
arrangement that is built into the right rear seat 
armrest for use by the Systems Operator. When the 
Surrogate UAS software is running, a series of GUI 
menus may be activated to control all aspects of the 
software in the aircraft and in the Ground Station. A 
system of GUI’s are used by the System Operator to 
enable or disable certain software functions, change 
control law gains, change filter parameters and enter 
the four UAS commands. When entering a command, 
the System Operator has the option of entering the 
command from the keyboard or using the left mouse 
button to click a GUI + or – symbol to advance or 
retard the existing value. When commands are sent 
from the Ground Station and received in the aircraft, 
they are echoed back to the Ground Station for 
display on the moving map display. This confirms to 
the Ground Station Operator that the commands were 
received in the aircraft. The aircraft moving map 
display also displays the commands. Voice radio 
communications is also used between the Safety 
Pilot/Pilot in Command and the Ground Station to 
verify operations. 
Integrated Test Concept 
MITRE and NASA LaRC collaborated to 
develop an integrated capability for testing prototype 
SAA system elements with an initial emphasis on 
ADS-B based algorithmic alternatives for self 
separation (see Figure 4). Algorithms (developed in-
house or by other research organizations) are first 
evaluated on the MITRE algorithmEvaluator. If 
performance is satisfactory, the same algorithms can 
then be evaluated in flight onboard the NASA LaRC 
Surrogate UAS testbed. The resulting performance 
data informs incremental-design efforts, and the 
integrated test concept accelerates the maturation 
process. 
 
Figure 4. Integrated Test Concept 
Within the algorithmEvaluator, algorithm 
sensitivities are exposed and test cases warranting 
further examination can be earmarked for flight 
evaluation. Observed responses (of the algorithm 
under test within the simulated testbed) directly 
inform test-card development activities for live 
flights by helping baseline performance expectations 
for both the Test Director and the Safety Pilot/Pilot in 
Command. In doing so, valuable flight hours can be 
spared by honing entry/exit conditions and 
establishing performance-based go/no-go criteria up 
front. 
While exhaustively testing SAA algorithms in 
flight is impractical, each flight evaluation yields 
invaluable insights into real-world performance and 
challenges. Flight evaluations offer an opportunity to 
not only collect data that informs algorithm-
development efforts, but also demonstrate 
concept/technology readiness to interested 
stakeholders and producing data to validate or inform 
improvements to the computer simulation testbed. 
Through a progressive series of experiments and 
flight demonstrations with the MITRE-NASA LaRC 
integrated simulation-to-flight capability, technical 
and operational issues can be thoroughly examined 
and candidate solutions systematically explored. 
Capability Demonstration 
The previous sections describe the basic 
capabilities of the integrated simulation-to-flight 
capability.  The following subsections describe two 
demonstrations of the capability in action.  
Proof-of-Capability Flights 
In the fall of 2011 a generic SAA algorithm was 
integrated into the Surrogate UAS software to permit 
demonstration of the SAA capability in an 
operationally relevant environment. The flight test 
was designed to demonstrate the ability of a typical 
SAA algorithm to monitor the ADS-B locations of 
other proximate aircraft, detect a conflict and, upon 
reaching certain pre-specified criteria, enter the 
Surrogate UAS control loop and command a 
maneuver to assure separation from an intruder 
aircraft. The generic algorithm was developed by 
MITRE and jointly integrated by a NASA/MITRE 
team. 
The in-flight capability demonstration was 
accomplished on several flights flown from the 
NASA LaRC using the SR22 Surrogate UAS as the 
simulated UAS and a NASA ADS-B-equipped 
Cessna 206 as the intruder aircraft. Three encounter 
geometries were used to perform the demonstration: a 
head-on encounter, an overtake encounter, and a 
converging encounter. Since the purpose of the 
flights was simply to demonstrate the basic SAA 
capability, an exhaustive set of geometries was not 
considered necessary. The demonstration was flown 
in daylight/VMC conditions so that non-participating 
aircraft could be seen and avoided by the two Safety 
Pilot/Pilot in Commands in accordance with 14 CFR 
Part 91.111/113. The encounters were set up by the 
participating pilots using a combination of electronic 
navigation signals, ground references, and 
coordinated timed turns. All encounters required the 
SR22 Safety Pilot/Pilot in Command to have visual 
contact with the C206 intruder aircraft for the 
encounter to proceed inside of the pilot’s estimate of 
3 nmi or 1 minute to the closest point of approach 
(CPA), whichever was lower. 
The Surrogate UAS software was designed to 
monitor the ADS-B messages from all proximate 
aircraft, but only to take action based on the 
messages from the participating intruder aircraft. The 
true ADS-B altitude of the intruder aircraft was sent 
to the Safety Pilot/Pilot in Command traffic display, 
but the altitude sent to the SAA algorithm was offset 
by 500 feet (see Figure 5). This allowed the 
encounters to be conducted with 500 feet of vertical 
separation at all times while the SAA algorithm 
believed the aircraft to be co-altitude. Since the 
simple algorithm integrated for this demonstration 
was capable of generating only “fly-down” 
commands, triggering of the automatic SAA 
capability always resulted in an increase in vertical 
separation of the aircraft. For this demonstration, 
once the algorithm triggered and the simulated UAS 
responded in the correct manner, the demonstration 
was considered complete. 
In all cases, once the aircraft move within the 
triggering parameters for the algorithm, a proper 
command was issued and the Surrogate UAS 
responded in the predicted manner. Data was not 
collected on algorithm performance or generated 
miss distances since the purpose of the flights was 
only to demonstrate a capability, not to conduct 
algorithm research. 
The flights were witnessed by technical and 
management personnel from both NASA LaRC and 
MITRE as this proof-of-capability was necessary to 
allow progression to the next phase of testing in 
which algorithm research would be conducted. The 
algorithm research phase is currently underway and is 
briefly described in the next section. 
 Figure 5. Altitude Offset Schema 
Algorithm Research and Development 
In the summer of 2012, performance capabilities 
of candidate SAA algorithms were baselined using 
the MITRE algorithmEvaluator. The baseline 
focused on an algorithm’s ability to detect potential 
separation conflicts and issue maneuver commands 
that maintain separation distance in both horizontal 
and vertical dimensions. 
For all simulated encounters in the baseline, the 
intruder aircraft flew due north at a fixed altitude and 
speed, and encounter parameters were varied to 
create trajectories that—if unmitigated—resulted in 
either collisions, near-miss cases (i.e., no collision, 
but within separation thresholds), “at-threshold” 
cases, or “beyond-threshold” cases. For the baseline 
scenarios, the algorithms were provided traffic 
updates at one second intervals without 
interruption/loss, corruption of data, ADS-B 
measurement noise, or communications latency. 
Encounter parameters (and aircraft-specific 
initialization settings) are shown in Figure 6.  
Figure 6. Encounter Parameters 
Baseline results were then provided to algorithm 
developers to enable targeted improvements. For 
example, the SAA logic of one particular algorithm 
periodically failed when subjected to initial headings 
of 30, 60, and/or 90 degrees. 
To help the developer ascertain the nature and 
severity of the 30, 60, and 90 degrees violations, two 
graphs were created. Graph A in Figure 7 depicts the 
depth and cumulative duration of separation 
violations across all encounters, while graph B in 
Figure 7 displays each of the offending trajectories 
(truncated at ±3 nmi from the closest point of 
approach). Both graphs confirm that the violations 
occurred at the edge of the separation volume. 
 
Figure 7. Violation Insights 
Armed with the knowledge that—even under 
optimum communications and traffic-awareness 
conditions—the SAA algorithm under test is 
particularly vulnerable to select, shallow-angle 
scenarios, the algorithm developer is presently 
revisiting the associated logic chains and buffer 
settings to ensure that future revisions are more 
resilient to such scenarios. Furthermore, with access 
to the baselined encounter scenarios and results, the 
developer is able to systematically evaluate the 
performance of each proposed enhancement and 
confirm its role in and impact on the maturation 
process. 
Future Studies 
Flight evaluations of candidate SAA algorithms 
are planned for September 2012 using the NASA 
LaRC Surrogate UAS testbed. The flight evaluations 
will occur in eastern North Dakota over a 2-week 
period in partnership with the University of North 
Dakota. These flights will help validate the results of 
extensive modeling and simulation studies conducted 
by MITRE and other algorithm development research 
organizations. In addition, as the MITRE-NASA 
LaRC research team uses the integrated capability to 
explore the viability of cooperative automatic SAA in 
an operationally relevant environment, the September 
2012 efforts will serve as an end-to-end 
demonstration of the integrated test concept. 
Since the October 2011 demonstration, a more 
sophisticated version of the Surrogate UAS SAA 
capability has been developed. This expanded 
capability allows the integration and testing of 
multiple SAA algorithms in flight and also allows the 
integration of targets derived from various ground-
based sensors with ADS-B and TIS-B targets. This 
enhanced capability is currently being tested at 
NASA LaRC with cooperation from the other project 
partners, and it will serve a key role in the flight 
evaluations scheduled for September 2012 in eastern 
North Dakota. 
While the immediate future use of the integrated 
simulation-to-flight SAA capability is targeted at 
cooperative automatic SAA, this effort represents 
only one of several possible approaches to solving 
UAS SAA challenges. The authors hope that the 
basic capability demonstrated last October at NASA 
LaRC and the September 2012 campaign in eastern 
North Dakota will lead to opportunities for further 
expansion of the simulation-to-flight capability and 
the testing of other SAA approaches. 
Summary 
The NASA-MITRE team has developed an 
integrated simulation and flight test capability for 
testing prototype sense-and-avoid system elements 
with an initial emphasis on ADS-B based algorithmic 
alternatives for self separation. This integrated 
system includes the capability to develop algorithms, 
perform fast-time simulation testing, generate fitness 
reports, integrate into the flight software framework, 
and execute flight tests in real-world conditions. The 
algorithm development and fast-time simulation 
testing capabilities were developed by MITRE. The 
software framework for hosting multiple SAA 
algorithms, and the flight testing capabilities of the 
Surrogate UAS aircraft were developed by the NASA 
LaRC Research Center. These separately developed 
capabilities were brought together and have resulted 
in a successful SAA flight test in October 2011. The 
value of this integrated process was fully 
demonstrated and will be expanded to accommodate 
multiple SAA algorithms in the flight evaluations 
scheduled for September 2012 in eastern North 
Dakota. This process can serve as a model for the 
development of systems and algorithms needed to 
enable the safe integration of UAS in the NAS. 
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